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This paper extends the idea of using ex-ante risk measures in a model of precau-
tionary savings by explicitly simulating future net-income risks. The uncertainty
measure takes into account the interdependency of labour market and health status.
The model is estimated for prime age males using the German Socio-Economic
Panel Study for years 2001-2007. The empirical analysis is conducted using a
measure for savings stocks and savings ﬂows. The latter model allows to control for
individual speciﬁc eﬀects. I ﬁnd evidence for precautionary savings in response to
the uncertainty measures. The results are robust and stable across speciﬁcations.
There is evidence for a share of precautionary wealth of about 14 to 17 percent.
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The idea that individuals build up precautionary wealth because future income is random
and not determinate was formally analysed by Leland (1968) for the ﬁrst time and
extended by the works of Sandmo (1970) and Dreze and Modigliani (1972). The theory
predicts that individuals accumulate precautionary wealth to insure themselves against
potential future income shocks. It gained importance in the context of the life-cycle
hypothesis of consumption (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954). The precautionary motive
for accumulating wealth may be able to explain several so-called “consumption puzzles”
that cannot be explained by traditional certainty or certainty-equivalence models (Zeldes,
1989). For example, it oﬀers an explanation for the excess sensitivity of consumption
to anticipated income ﬂuctuations, the growth of consumption in the presence of a low
real interest rate, and low spending of the elderly (Zeldes, 1989). Hubbard et al. (1995)
argue that low wealth accumulation of many US households is not consistent with the
traditional life-cycle model. They show that introducing uncertainty or precautionary
savings can solve this puzzle. A large number of studies has been devoted to analyse the
impact of income uncertainty1 on savings (a survey of the life-cycle model can be found
in Browning and Crossley, 2001). The magnitude of individuals’ reaction to income
uncertainty by accumulating precautionary savings is expected to be higher the more
risk averse individuals are. If this holds true for the economy in general, the quantitative
relevance of the precautionary motive has important implications for government policies
that aﬀect income uncertainty (Aiyagari, 1994; Femminis, 2001; Kimball and Mankiw,
1989).
Although the theoretical concept appears to closely reﬂect everyday ideas of savings
1 The literature on precautionary savings does no distinguish between (measurable) risk and (immea-
surable) uncertainty in a Knightian sense (Knight, 1921). In line with the literature, I use both
concepts interchangeably and assume that both economic uncertainty and economic risk can be
measured and operationalised with a probability distribution that is known to the individual.
2behaviour, empirical estimates of precautionary wealth are exceptionally diverse. The
ﬁndings range from high shares of precautionary wealth in total wealth (e.g., Carroll
and Samwick, 1997; Dardanoni, 1991; Engen and Gruber, 2001; Lusardi, 1998) to little
or no precautionary wealth at all (e.g., Dynan, 1993; Guiso et al., 1992; Skinner, 1988).
However, applied studies on the existence and signiﬁcance of precautionary savings are
confronted with a lot of conceptual and methodological problems, which might have
contributed to the plurality of results (Browning and Lusardi, 1996; Kennickell and
Lusardi, 2004).
The fundamental assumption underlying this model is that individuals assess the need
for precautionary savings conditional on their expectations of future income risks. As a
consequence, empirical studies applying this model have to ﬁnd a reliable measure of
income risk expectations that actually corresponds to households’ risk expectations at
the time savings decisions are made. Although the concept of precautionary savings
relates current wealth to future income levels and shocks, and is thus related to individual
expectations, the standard approach to model income risks in the literature is based
on ex-post measures of household speciﬁc income variation. A likely reason for this
restriction is the lack of good data on ex-ante risk expectations. Ex-post measures are
likely to capture part of the expected income path, although only income ﬂuctuations
that have actually occurred and may also reﬂect choices. The focus on observed income
ﬂuctuations is restrictive because the scenarios that trigger precautionary saving will not
inevitably occur. For example, it is plausible to assume that an employed individual saves
money as a precaution against the risk of becoming unemployed. Usually, however, these
kinds of savings decisions remain unobserved in survey data. Surveys that ask for saving
motives usually ﬁnd that the precautionary motive is important for savings (Alessie et al.,
1997; Börsch-Supan and Essig, 2003; Kennickell and Lusardi, 2004; Schunk, 2009). The
ideal ex-ante risk measure would have to comprise this counterfactual information as
well.
3Only a few studies have considered ex-ante measures of economic risk. The most
obvious indicators, which meet this criterion, probably are subjective assessments of
economic risks. Unfortunately, these indicators often lack enough variation to identify an
eﬀect of income uncertainty on savings. However, some studies take advantage of detailed
income risk assessments and simulate the corresponding ex-ante income variances (e.g.,
Arrondel, 2002; Guiso et al., 1992; Lusardi, 1997, 1998). Still, such detailed subjective
data are rarely collected and not available for Germany. Moreover, the more realistic
the respective set of questions is, the more complex and diﬃcult to understand the
questions get. A more ﬂexible alternative is to simulate ex-ante risk scenarios and the
corresponding income variance based on empirical estimates. This has been done using
predicted unemployment risk – which is certainly one of the most important economic
risks before retirement – in a model of precautionary savings (e.g., Benito, 2006; Carroll
et al., 2003). In a similar study, Engen and Gruber (2001) use simulated unemployment
beneﬁts to calculate replacement rates and show that the generosity of the unemployment
insurance has an impact on savings for the group of employed individuals.
This paper extends the idea of using future unemployment risk in a model of precau-
tionary savings in several ways. First, the simulation comprises three future periods
to calculate the uncertainty measure. This way I account for dynamic eﬀects of unem-
ployment in two ways: the model for unemployment controls for true state dependence
in the employment status, and the expected future wage is modelled dependent on the
previous labour market status. A second contribution of my model is that I explicitly
include health as a risk into a model of precautionary savings. To my opinion, health
constitutes an important factor for several reasons. To begin with, health plays a major
role in determining labour market activity. As a consequence, the ﬁnancial situation
of the individual and the household are also determined by health. In addition, poor
health is a risk, about which individuals may have a lot of private information, and
it seems straightforward to account for it in the analysis of precautionary savings. As
4labour market risks are aﬀected by poor health and vice-versa, I also have to consider
that health and employment may be endogenously determined (e.g. Haan and Myck,
2009). Thus, to account for health risks will improve the identiﬁcation of labour market
related uncertainty. Third, a detailed tax-beneﬁt microsimulation model is applied to
calculate the expected income in each scenario, i.e. combinations of being in employ-
ment/unemployment and good health/bad health, which constitute the basis to calculate
an ex-ante income variance.
Further contributions of this chapter to the literature on savings behaviour are the
following: the empirical analysis is conducted using a measure for saving stocks and
saving ﬂows. The latter model allows to control for individual speciﬁc eﬀects. Moreover,
I apply the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to the wealth aggregate used in the
estimation. This is a log-like transformation that allows to keep zero and negative wealth
observations in the data.2
The next section provides an overview of previous research with a focus on diﬀerent
measures of uncertainty. The following section introduces the estimation models and my
approach to model the ex-ante income risk measure. Section 4 presents data, sample and
variables. Section 5 shows the results of the simulated uncertainty measure, and Section
6 presents the buﬀer-stock model and the monthly savings regression. The following
section discusses the results and draws several conclusions from the empirical evidence.
2 I discuss health within this chapter in its relation to the employment status. Another interesting
research question would be to particularly analyse the relationship of health shocks and precautionary
savings. However, this would exceed the scope of my study here. The literature on health risk in the
context of precautionary savings is much more focused on the health insurance than on the relation
between health, employment and wages. Thus, the focus is on uncertainties about future health care
expenditures, which give rise to household savings. In an early simulation, Kotlikoﬀ (1989) showed
for the life-cycle model that savings increase if there is uncertainty about medical expenditures (cf.
Palumbo, 1999). Hubbard et al. (1995) argues that asset-means tested social insurance programs
can prevent low income households from building up assets. Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) test this
hypothesis empirically using US data on reforms of the Medicaid program. They ﬁnd that Medicaid
eligibility has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on wealth. In a study for Italy, Jappelli et al. (2007)
exploit regional variation in health care quality and show that low quality has a positive eﬀect on
precautionary wealth. They conclude that uncertainty about medical expenditures may explain the
low dissaving rate of retirees.
52. Previous research
Precautionary savings can be interpreted as a reaction of individuals to insure themselves
against (uninsurable) future uncertainty. The resulting precautionary wealth stock is
deﬁned as the diﬀerence of total wealth holdings to the wealth stock that would be
observed if there was no uncertainty (Kimball, 1990). Simulations based on intertemporal
models of optimal consumption-savings decisions with income uncertainty show that
precautionary wealth may explain a sizeable share of total wealth. For example, Skinner
(1988) argues that half of total wealth can be explained by precautionary motives. The
studies by Caballero (1991), Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Cagetti (2003) estimate
similarly high or even higher shares of precautionary wealth.3 However, empirical studies
using micro data yield exceptionally diverse results that range from no precautionary
wealth (e.g., Dynan, 1993; Skinner, 1988) to large shares of 50 percent and more (e.g.,
Carroll and Samwick, 1997, 1998; Dardanoni, 1991).
Several methodological and conceptual factors may have contributed to the hetero-
geneity of empirical results. Table 13 in the Appendix provides an overview of selected
empirical studies on precautionary savings. One of the most challenging factors is to
model the uncertainty relevant for the study of precautionary savings (Kennickell and
Lusardi, 2004). A large number of studies focuses solely on income risk in order to model
uncertainty. A common approach is to use some stochastic panel data model of net
household income and to derive ex-post variance measures based on this income model
(Carroll and Samwick, 1998; Fossen and Rostam-Afschar, 2009; Hubbard et al., 1995;
3 As Carroll and Kimball (2008) note, the results of Gourinchas and Parker (2002) and Cagetti (2003)
should be approached with caution. Both studies calibrate a life cycle optimization problem using
empirical estimates of income variance and the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) by Carroll
and Samwick (1997). The estimated CRRA depends on the model’s assumptions about income
uncertainty as faced by the household at the time of the savings decision. Low et al. (2010) show that
the estimates by Carroll and Samwick (1997) may overstate the magnitude of shocks to permanent
income by as much as 50 percent. They argue that endogenous job mobility choices account for a
large proportion of wage ﬂuctuations in Carroll and Samwick (1997).
6Kazarosian, 1997). Others use the variability of expenditures (Dynan, 1993). However,
when using this proxy, it may be diﬃcult to distinguish between transitory income and
measurement error (Kennickell and Lusardi, 2004). Another aspect is that individuals
may already be insured against the estimated income uncertainty (Browning and Lusardi,
1996; Caballero, 1991). Furthermore, these proxies may contain large adjustable elements
which increase the variance of earnings but rather reﬂect choices than uncertainty (Carroll
et al., 2003; Guiso et al., 1992; Low et al., 2010).
Important for the present study is a part of the research literature that uses ex-ante
risk measures. Some studies use subjective uncertainty indicators in combination with
an income simulation. Often these measures show a small variance of income risks,
which renders identiﬁcation diﬃcult. Self-assessed income or employment risks is often
measured by categorical variables with few categories. The studies by Guiso et al. (1992)
for Italy and Arrondel (2002) for France rely on a very detailed subjective risk assessment
of future real household income development. The corresponding income is simulated to
construct an income uncertainty measure. Both studies ﬁnd only small, but signiﬁcant
shares of precautionary wealth – roughly between two and ﬁve percent. Lusardi (1997)
reestimates the data used in Guiso et al. (1992) with an IV approach and ﬁnds a much
higher share of precautionary wealth of about 20 to 24 percent.
Using US data, Lusardi (1998) conducts a similar exercise with self-assessed unem-
ployment probabilities, although without simulating household speciﬁc replacement rates
for this uncertainty measure. Her ﬁndings on the share of precautionary wealth are
similar to Guiso et al. (1992) and Arrondel (2002) and range from one to 3.5 percent. For
Germany, Essig (2005) applies the same uncertainty measure and simulates the respective
unemployment replacement rate for the household. However, eﬀects are insigniﬁcant.
Another related strand of the literature uses estimated ex-ante indicators. Carroll
et al. (2003) simulate unemployment beneﬁts for employed individuals in the US and
exploits individual and regional variation in unemployment beneﬁt entitlements. Results
7are mixed and suggest that precautionary savings are income dependent. Whereas low
income households do not engage in precautionary savings, evidence can be found for
precautionary savings behaviour in higher income groups. However, when housing is
excluded from the measure of wealth, the eﬀect of unemployment risk turns insigniﬁcant.
Although it is plausible to assume that housing equity is part of precautionary wealth,
the authors cannot answer the question why no precautionary wealth eﬀect can be found
regarding more liquid assets.
Using US data, Engen and Gruber (2001) show that small savings of low income house-
holds may be explained by the provision and generosity of unemployment transfers. They
regress gross ﬁnancial wealth on the individual unemployment insurance replacement rate
and unemployment risk. One of their ﬁndings is that the generosity of the unemployment
insurance decreases savings: a ten percent increase in replacement rate would lower
savings by 2.8 percent. Benito (2006) uses the probability to become unemployed in the
next period to proxy uncertainty with UK data. He uses weekly food consumption as the
dependent variable which might inﬂuence the comparability of his model with other cited
studies. He models uncertainty with an estimated and a subjective measure of future
unemployment probability. His results show that a one standard deviation increase in
unemployment risk lowers weekly food consumption by 2.7 percent. And he shows that
this eﬀect is stronger for younger households. He interprets this result as evidence for
a precautionary savings motive. My own results suggest that using the unemployment
probability as a measure of income risk might be problematic. Individuals with a high
risk of becoming unemployed may also have below average incomes and – with respect
to labour market success – disadvantageous characteristics that might drive the results
using unemployment risk alone. Instead, it seems important to control whether results
change when the same probabilities are used together with a simulation of income in
8each state.4
Some studies proxy uncertainty with the occupational status because certain jobs entail
higher/lower earnings variance or higher/lower risk of job loss (Fuchs-Schündeln and
Schündeln, 2005; Skinner, 1988). Using US data, Skinner (1988) proxies the degree of
earnings risks by including dummies for self-employed and farmers in a savings regression.
He ﬁnds no evidence for precautionary savings. On the contrary, the self-employed as
well as farmers appear to save even less than other occupational groups. Lusardi (1997)
reports similar ﬁndings for Italy. A potential reason is that individuals with diﬀerent
tastes for risk choose diﬀerent occupations. This would induce a selection eﬀect and
bias the estimates downwards. However, it could also be the case that data on saving
ﬂows of the self-employed suﬀer from large measurement error because it may be hard
to distinguish between business expenditures from personal consumption (Carroll and
Samwick, 1998). Another selection eﬀect results from the fact that we do not observe
the self-employed who experienced a negative wealth shock and changed occupation,
which would result in a positive bias. Carroll and Samwick (1997, 1998) report that
high levels of precautionary savings disappear if the self-employed are excluded from the
sample. As Hurst et al. (2010) and Fossen and Rostam-Afschar (2009) point out, this
constitutes a problem because the self-employed show higher income uncertainty and
higher levels of wealth for other reasons than precautionary motives. Therefore, when
including the self-employed in the sample, it is of key importance to properly account
for this group. Using data for Germany, Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) solve
the problem of self-selection by exploiting a natural experiment in which selection into
risk-less occupations is exogenous. They deﬁne a risk-less occupation as having a civil
servant status (life-time tenure). Using SOEP they ﬁnd that about 20 percent of all
4 I check the simulated income variance using it as a regressor for subjectively assessed job risks. It
turns out that simulated unemployment probabilities are positively correlated with self-assessed job
risks but income variance has a negative sign (Section 5.1).
9gross ﬁnancial and housing wealth in East Germany and 12 percent in West Germany
follow a precautionary motive.5
For Germany, only a few studies have yet analysed the precautionary savings model
and none of these used estimated unemployment probabilities or health risks as a proxy
for future uncertainty. Using SOEP data from 2002, Bartzsch (2006, 2008) estimates a
buﬀer-stock savings model and applies diﬀerent measures of income variance to proxy
uncertainty. He ﬁnds that roughly 20 percent of net ﬁnancial wealth traces back to the
precautionary savings motive. His results suggest that housing equity is not used as
a buﬀer against income shocks. As mentioned above, Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln
(2005) proxy uncertainty with occupation and ﬁnd evidence for precautionary savings
particularly in East Germany. Using the same data for the years 2002 and 2007, the
study by Fossen and Rostam-Afschar (2009) does not ﬁnd any evidence for precautionary
savings. They explicitly account for heterogeneity between entrepreneurial and non-
entrepreneurial households and show that the higher savings rate of the self-employed
can not be attributed to the precautionary savings motive. They argue that the eﬀect of
precautionary savings vanishes once net worth is used as a measure of wealth and that
the signiﬁcant eﬀect on liquid assets could rather reﬂect portfolio decisions.
Using an error components model, Beznoska and Ochmann (2010) ﬁnd signiﬁcant
eﬀects of income uncertainty on precautionary savings. In their model, a doubling of
transitory income uncertainty increases savings by 4.4 percent or 43 euro for an average
household, which is similar to the results of the savings ﬂows regression in this paper.
Giavazzi and McMahon (forthcoming) use the pension reform in Germany in 1997 as a
quasi-experiment because it was revoked after the elections in 1998 and never came into
5 Their study also reﬂects the above mentioned large diversity of results. The baseline speciﬁcation
is a linear model with log of gross ﬁnancial and housing wealth as dependent variable. The model
excludes zero or negative wealth observations. As a robustness check, the authors also estimate a
tobit speciﬁcation, in which zero wealth observations were included. From this speciﬁcation they do
not ﬁnd any precautionary wealth in West Germany and even 68 percent in East Germany.
10force. Their results suggest that the implied increase in income uncertainty increased
savings.6 Essig (2005) conducted one of the few studies for Germany that is not using
SOEP data. Using SAVE, he shows that individuals with negative expectations about
the future tend to save less. And he does not ﬁnd an eﬀect of subjective unemployment
probabilities on savings. However, using these expectations might be misleading in
the context of precautionary savings. It is very likely that households with negative
expectations about the future have also low income and low income variance (see also
Section 5.1).
This section has illustrated the diversity of measures of economic uncertainty and has
shown how heterogeneous the outcomes of these studies are. In the following, I contribute
to the evolving literature by developing an ex-ante measure of economic risks that combines
two interdependent labour market risks: future health and unemployment status. My
analysis further contributes to the literature by using a detailed microsimulation model to
simulate the respective net household income for each potential risk scenario. Moreover,
I estimate panel models, whereas most of the aforementioned studies are based on
cross-sectional models.
3. Modelling precautionary savings
3.1. Buﬀer-stock wealth and savings model
The primary estimation equation follows the literature and models precautionary savings
in a buﬀer-stock wealth model, as suggested by Deaton (1991) and Carroll et al. (1992);
Carroll and Samwick (1997, 1998). The model is centered around a target wealth-to-
income ratio W
P . Where W denotes the relevant wealth measure and P the level of
6 They also analyse the labour supply decision and ﬁnd that household heads who work part-time
increase their labour supply in response to the reform.
11permanent income. W
P positively depends on uncertainty, σ, as faced by the individual.
In the steady state, when the target is reached, income uncertainty should have no eﬀect
on the savings rate (Carroll and Samwick, 1997). If wealth exceeds or falls below the
target, the wealth is expected to fall (dissaving) and to increase (saving), respectively.
The importance of the precautionary motive depends on the degree to which wealth
increases with uncertainty. In addition, the target ratio may depend on household
characteristics X and unobserved factors ε:
W
P
= f (σ,X) + ε (1)
Carroll and Samwick (1998) show that the buﬀer-stock model predicts an approximately
linear relationship between the log of target wealth ratio and the measure of income
uncertainty. Permanent income is included as a right hand side variable to allow for
non-homothetic preferences:




wlog (Pit) + β
0wXit + εit (2)
Identiﬁcation of the relationship in equation (2) is closely related to the chosen measures
of wealth, permanent income, and uncertainty. To ﬁnd an appropriate aggregated wealth
measure for the model is diﬃcult. In general, the portfolio elements will diﬀer with
respect to their risk and liquidity characteristics (Kennickell and Lusardi, 2004). An
illiquid asset cannot serve as a precaution against income shocks. However, it is not
obvious what an illiquid asset actually is. Some studies, such as Kazarosian (1997) or
Engen and Gruber (2001) have only considered ﬁnancial wealth, which may however be
too restrictive. For example, housing wealth could be pledged as collateral, making that
12asset more liquid. I estimate equation ((2)) using two diﬀerent wealth measures, net
worth (NW) and ﬁnancial assets (FW). NW includes all wealth components except for
business assets, whereas FW is a subset of NW and consists of liquid assets. In particular
FW does not include housing equity. If there is a precautionary savings motive, which
does not only reﬂect a portfolio decision, I expect the eﬀect of income uncertainty to
be higher for liquid assets but still signiﬁcant for net worth. Moreover, as described
in Section 2, it makes sense to include real estate assets in the wealth measure since
previous studies reported strong sensitivity of results if it was included.7
If uncertainty has a positive impact on the stock of wealth, it should also increase
saving ﬂows. As Guiso et al. (1992) argue, to estimate whether income uncertainty has
an eﬀect on asset accumulation and saving ﬂows can be seen as a test of the validity
of both models and as two independent tests of the theory of precautionary savings.
Therefore, in addition to the buﬀer-stock model with FW and NW, I estimate a second
model using the monthly ﬂow of savings as dependent variable. Carroll and Kimball
(2008) emphasize that both concepts, stock and ﬂow values, are easily confused and
should be well distinguished. To clarify terminology for the following analysis, I refer
to the ﬂow value as “saving” or “savings ﬂows” and to the stock value as “savings” or
“wealth”. The ad-hoc savings model regresses the log of monthly savings ﬂows sit on the






0sXit + ui + eit (3)
With respect to the measure of permanent income, I use an approach proposed by Fuchs-
Schündeln and Schündeln (2005). In a given year, net household income is detrended
7 For example, the results in Carroll et al. (2003) and Bartzsch (2008) change completely when housing
is included in the measure of wealth.
13by dividing it through the average net household income. In a second step, the average
detrended net household income for each household is calculated. The product of average
annual net household income and the detrended average net household income gives the
measure of permanent income.8
Quantify precautionary savings
To approximately quantify the amount of precautionary savings based on the estimated
coeﬃcients, a counterfactual simulation is conducted (cf. Carroll and Samwick, 1998). I
compare the current savings ﬂows with a situation, in which each household faces the
same small income risk σmin. The same simulation is done for the buﬀer-stock wealth
model. Estimates of equation (3) are used to predict \ log(sit):
\ log(sit) = c θslog(σ
2
it) + c λslog(Pit) + c βs0Xit (4)
In the next step, log(σ2
it) is replaced by log(σ2







min) + c λslog(Pit) + c βs0Xit (5)
Then \ log(sit)
∗
is subtracted from \ log(sit) and divided by \ log(sit) to obtain a measure
of relative change in saving ﬂows if the household faced the (counterfactual) low risk
σmin. The share of precautionary saving ﬂows in the sample PS
∗ is simply the average
8 As a robustness check I calculated a diﬀerent measure of permanent income as in Bartzsch (2008).
The results do not change signiﬁcantly.
















Previous studies suggested to choose the minimum value of σ in the regression sample
for σmin (e.g., Carroll and Samwick, 1998). That value is equivalent to a set of household
characteristics which implies the lowest uncertainty level in the sample. However, the
choice is rather arbitrary and the minimum could strongly depend on outliers. Thus, in
addition to the minimum, equation (6) is also evaluated for the ﬁrst percentile of σ.9
3.2. An ex-ante measure of income uncertainty
The main contribution of this study is the simulation of the ex-ante uncertainty measure
σ2
it. As described above, many studies on precautionary savings use ex-post income
variance measures to proxy uncertainty. This approach implies an important assumption:
Realized income variations are equivalent to the perceived risk which gives rise to
precautionary savings. The advantage of using ex-post data is of course that it can be
observed. Moreover, the calculation of diﬀerent variance measures is straightforward in
this case. The disadvantage is however also obvious: this approach uses only realized
outcomes to identify the eﬀect of risk expectations on savings behaviour. As precautionary
savings are triggered by potential risks that do not have to actually occur, or, as Carroll
and Kimball (2008) put it, “precautionary saving result from the knowledge that the
future is uncertain”, it is straightforward to use counterfactual or diﬀerent potential
outcomes to construct a measure of uncertainty. As a natural alternative to ex-post
measured (observed) variance, I propose to use an ex-ante measure of income risk that is
9 As Carroll and Samwick (1998) emphasize, this is a ceteris-paribus simulation. In reality, we would
observe general equilibrium eﬀects, particularly on the interest rate.
15constructed from hypothetical (simulated) risk scenarios to explain precautionary savings
behaviour.
One of the most important labour market risks for prime age men is unemployment.
And the health status is highly related to the employment status. Unemployment has
not only an instantaneous eﬀect on income but also a negative impact on reemployment
probabilities and future wages. And bad health is strongly associated with unemployment
and is likely to aﬀect wages and work capacity negatively. In the precautionary savings
model, I follow most of the literature and interpret the labour market risks as exogenous
constraints for the individual savings decision.10 Both risks are modeled as binary
variables. A simulation model is used to assign probabilities to these labour market
risks and to simulate respective net household income in each possible state. This
approach implies the assumption that individuals perceive uncertainty as income variation
conditional on the likelihood that certain income risks may occur. To use the simulation
of net household income to build the income variance has the further advantage to enable
the simulation of reforms in the tax-beneﬁt system and their impact on precautionary
savings.
The combination of health, hit, and labour market status, lit, results in four possible
scenarios sit with:
10 Usually, this assumption is not stated explicitly but of course individuals could react to a change in
income variance by changing the employment behaviour as well as the savings behaviour.
16sit =

             
             
1 hit = 0,lit = 0
2 hit = 1,lit = 0
3 hit = 0,lit = 1




   





   
   
0 employed
1 unemployed
For each scenario sit I simulate the related income ys
it. If lit = 0, net income for the
scenario when unemployed is calculated, which depends on individual and household
characteristics Xit and the tax-beneﬁt function γt(.) . If lit = 1, net income depends on
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   
R
γt (wit,hit,Xit)dhit if s = 1,2
γt (Xit) if s = 3,4
(7)
The scenarios are treated as the outcome of a discrete random variable with probability
ps
it. The expected income over all possible states in period t is the probability weighted
predicted income Yit:























































17One important feature of the model is that it accounts for path dependency in lit and
hit by making them dependent on their own lag and the lag of the other variable. Thus,
the expected probabilities in t are conditional on being in state s in period t−1. For the
ﬁrst period, the state in t − 1 is known to the individual, whereas it has to be replaced
by an expected probability in t + 1 and t + 2. Equation (8) and (9) for periods t + 1
would contain 16 elements and 64 elements for period t + 2. The variance is calculated
over each possible income path and its probability. Moreover, wages also dependent on
the lagged labour market and health status. I treat working hours as exogenous and use
their observed distribution, diﬀerentiated by socio-economic characteristics, to simulate
working hours in future periods.
In the following, I explain the steps necessary to construct the uncertainty measure
and present the empirical results.
3.3. Simulation of the uncertainty measure
Health and employment
I model health and employment status jointly in a dynamic framework like Haan and
Myck (2009). That allows to control for true state dependence and takes into account
that unobservable characteristics can have a joint eﬀect on both outcomes. Haan and
Myck (2009) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation between the two processes and show that it is
important to control for state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity. In a similar
approach, I specify a bivariate dynamic probit model suggested by (Alessie et al., 2004)
and control for the initial conditions as in Wooldridge (2005).
The model is not a simultaneous but rather a sequential intertemporal model. That
implies the assumption that the health status in t does not aﬀect the employment status
in t and vice versa. The approach avoids the problem of ﬁnding exclusion restrictions
to identify a simultaneous relationship. Thus, it is not necessary to impose a coherency
18condition to ensure consistency. Both the intertemporal and the simultaneous model
require more or less strong assumptions for identiﬁcation. My strategy can be justiﬁed
by two arguments: As Haan and Myck (2009) argue, I observe both dependent variables
only at the time of the interview, which renders it impossible to determine the exact
chronological order of both processes. In addition, due to the inherent state dependence
in both employment and health status, the lagged indicators can be interpreted as good
proxies of their current status. The following speciﬁcation will be estimated:11
h
∗
it = hit−1γh + lit−1αe + hi0δh + x1itβh + c
h
i + ε1it (10a)
l
∗
it = lit−1γe + hit−1αh + li0δe + x2itβe + c
l
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, m := (l,h)
Health and employment status (hit and lit) depend on their own lag, their initial state
(hi0 and li0), the lagged indicator of the respective other variable and a set of independent
explanatory variables (x1it and x2it) which are assumed to be strictly exogenous. The
employment equation comprises some independent variables that are not elements of x1it,
the regional unemployment rate, other household income and nationality. All variables
in x1it are elements of x2it. In addition, I assume random individual eﬀects ch
i and cl
i that
are bivariate normal with variances σ2
h and σ2
l and covariance σ2
hσ2
l ρc. The idiosyncratic
error terms ε1it and ε2it are assumed to be independent over time and bivariate standard
normal with covariance ρc.
11 I use the Stata program GLLAMM to estimate the model.
19Hourly wages
The simulation of health and employment status results in conditional probabilities of
combinations of both states, scenarios sit. The ﬁrst step to associate these scenarios with
income from labour is to model hourly wages. However, the wage itself may depend on
previous unemployment and health status. Thus, wages are estimated conditional on
the lagged employment and health status. A simplifying assumption of my simulation is
that wages only depend on previous unemployment and health. As argued above, both
lagged health and employment status are excellent proxies for their current status.
As these eﬀects, in addition to the probabilities, will mainly drive the simulation of
income uncertainty, it is important for a valid simulation to estimate the eﬀects of bad
health and unemployment on wages consistently. I choose a panel data model suggested
by Wooldridge (1995), which simultaneously allows for ﬁxed eﬀects in both the main and
the selection equation. Using a within (ﬁxed eﬀects) estimator is particularly useful for
our application since unobserved heterogeneity is expected to have an important inﬂuence
on the wage regression. As long as selection is related to time constant unobserved
factors, possible sources for bias due to non-random selection are reduced by using the
ﬁxed eﬀects approach. However, selection through time-varying variables could still play
a major role. Therefore, I also specify a general selection mechanism that allows for ﬁxed
eﬀects. For the wage and the selection equation, the following model is estimated:
wit = x1itβx1 + x2itβx2 + µi + uit (11)




In equation (11), wit denotes the hourly wage rate, the vector of explanatory variables
x1it refers to characteristics observed regardless of whether being employed or unemployed
20while x2it is only observed for the employed. µi is an unobserved time-constant individual
speciﬁc eﬀect, uit is a time-varying idiosyncratic error. lit in equation (12) is a selection
indicator which equals unity if the expression in the indicator function 1[.] is true. In
this application, x1it is a subset of zit, which implies that the model is not only identiﬁed
by functional form. To improve identiﬁcation, I choose a set of variables that is assumed
to inﬂuence participation and not the wage rate. The selection equation also contains an
individual speciﬁc error, κi, and a strictly exogenous12 normally distributed time varying
error eit.
The presence of κi in the non-linear selection equation renders estimation of this
selection model diﬃcult. Wooldridge (1995, 2004) suggests to use a Mundlak version of
Chamberlain’s random eﬀects probit model in this case (Chamberlain, 1984; Mundlak,
1978). Let ¯ zi denote the time average of zit, then κi can be replaced by ¯ ziθ + ωi:
lit = 1[¯ ziθ + zitγ + υit > 0], υit = ωi + lit (13)
E(ωi|zi) = 0 with xi = (x1i,x2i,...,xTi)
A valid correction procedure requires two additional linearity assumptions (Wooldridge,
2004). First, I assume that uit is mean independent of ¯ zi conditional on υit and can be
expressed as linear projection onto υit. Second, I specify the conditional mean of the
ﬁxed eﬀect in the main equation as a linear projection onto (¯ x1i,¯ x2i,υit). Wooldridge’s
estimator does not impose distributional assumptions about the error terms and the
individual eﬀect in the main equation. I estimate the following ﬁnal speciﬁcation:
12 Strictly exogenous means that lit is neither correlated with κi nor with zit ∀t.
21wit = ¯ x1iξx1 + x1itβx1 + ¯ x2iξx2 + x2itβx2 + ζtλit + νit (14)
The inverse Mills ratios (IMR), λt, are obtained from t cross sectional probit estimations
of equation (13). Equation (14) can then be estimated by pooled OLS. A variance that
is robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity is estimated by a “panel bootstrap”
(Semykina and Wooldridge, 2010).
Working hours
The next step to simulate gross labour income is to generate a distribution of working
hours. I simplify the simulation model by assigning the distribution of working hours
in period t to the simulated scenarios. To this end, I divide the distribution of working
hours into quintiles and generate the corresponding categories. I estimate a multinomial
logit that depends on the same set of job characteristics and household variables as
hourly wages. Again, the model is estimated separately for East and West Germany.
The results are used to predict probabilities for each hours category. Expected hours
are calculated by multiplying these probabilities with mean hours of each category and
adding them up (results not reported).
Simulation of net household income and income variance
Net household income is simulated using the Tax-Beneﬁt Microsimulation Model (STSM).
This detailed tax-beneﬁt model comprises the main features of the German tax and
transfer system.13 Net household income is calculated by deducting income tax and
social security contributions and by adding individual or household transfers (e.g. child
beneﬁts, unemployment beneﬁts and housing beneﬁts).
13 A detailed description of the STSM can be found in Steiner et al. (2008).
22I use the simulated information (probabilities) on labour market status (employed or
unemployed), health status (good and bad health), and the respective labour earnings
(zero or positive) and keep other household income constant. As described above, I
simulate the incomes for diﬀerent combinations of health and employment status. For
the current application, the model simulates net household income three periods ahead.
The expected income in period t is given by:








To simplify notation, I drop the panel and time indices (i,t). Instead, let p
s,r
t+1 denote
the probability of state s in t + 1, given state r in period t. In addition I assume a





















r,s,f,k =1,2,3,4; j = 1,...,64
Since the state r in period t is known, 64 (s × f × k) possible combinations remain for

















The simulated measure for σ2
it is then used in the estimation of equations (2) and (3)
and to quantify the share of precautionary savings in total wealth and monthly savings,
respectively.
234. Data and variables
The ﬁrst part of this section brieﬂy describes the estimation sample and variables used
in the simulation of σ2
it. The second part discusses the samples and variables of the main
estimation equations in more detail. In addition, using diﬀerent subjective ex-ante risk
assessments, this section comprises an informal test of the simulated income uncertainty
measure.
My analysis is based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP).14
To estimate health and employment probabilities and wages, I use unbalanced panel
data covering the period from 1997 until 2009. The sample is restricted to men between
29 and 59 years of age who are not self-employed, not retired, and not in education.
To account for the large regional diﬀerences in labour market situations, I estimate
the models separately for East and West Germany. Table 14 in the Appendix to this
chapter provides pooled descriptive statistics for the regression samples of the bivariate
probit. The selection equation for the wage model is based on the same sample. For
the estimation of wages a subset of working individuals is used (see Table 15 in the
Appendix).15
The analysis of savings is conducted at the household level. Since the development
of the uncertainty measure was restricted to prime age males, I assume the respective
individuals to be the household heads. Self-employed respondents are excluded from
the analysis since the risks model has only been developed for a sample of dependent
employees.
The models on saving ﬂows and buﬀer stock wealth are estimated for diﬀerent samples.
While data on monthly savings is collected annually in the SOEP, data on household’s
14 (See, e.g., Wagner et al., 2007) for more information on SOEP.
15 For the simulation I have to predict wages for individuals whose job characteristics are not observed.
I apply the same procedure as described in Geyer and Steiner (2010) and normalise (“orthogonalise”)
the respective dummies so that setting them equal to zero yields their average eﬀect. The same is
done for time dummies.
24ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial assets was collected only in 2002 and 2007. And the STSM is
available for the years 2001 through 2010. Given that the uncertainty measure is built
from three future periods, the years 2001 to 2007 remain available for estimation.
The pooled sample statistics for the estimation of saving ﬂows are presented in Table
1. In addition to permanent income and income variance, the model includes age, type of
household, unemployment experience, education and regional unemployment. I include
unemployment experience to have an additional control variable for past earnings history.
About 66 percent of the samples in both East and West Germany report positive
monthly savings. The ﬁrst model is estimated using log savings as dependent variable
and only includes observations with positive savings. As a robustness check I run panel
tobit models on the samples, including zero savings observations. In West Germany the
average amount of savings is about 360 euro for all observations and 540 euro conditional
on positive savings. Savings are about 40 euro lower in East Germany. In the samples
of respondents with positive savings, we can ﬁnd a higher share of higher educated
individuals as well as a higher average permanent income and income variance. Moreover,
the average unemployment experience is lower in these samples.
The permanent income measure is based on annual net household income which
includes, in addition to regular monthly income, components that are paid only once a
year or irregularly, like bonuses or vacation pay. Since our sample consists of prime age
males, the average permanent income is relatively high and amounts to 43,340 euro in
West Germany and to 35,244 euro in East Germany (sample with positive savings).
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the buﬀer-stock model. I use the same
variables as for the saving ﬂows model in the buﬀer-stock wealth model. In addition,
I control for risk attitudes. This information is available for the years 2004 and 2006.
The value of 2004 is used for the data in 2002 and 2006 for 2007. This is particularly
important, since self-selection might be important for the estimated savings reaction to
25Table 1: Saving ﬂows regression: Descriptive statistics by diﬀerent samples and region
West Germany East Germany
sav. >0 all sav. >0 all
Positive savings 1.000 0.665 1.000 0.656
Average savings (monthly) 538.387 358.249 496.845 325.752
log(σ2) 13.443 13.255 12.834 12.535
Log permanent income 10.584 10.516 10.368 10.261
Permanent income 43,340.633 40,754.090 35,244.039 32,128.337
Age 46.218 46.133 46.478 46.461
Type of household:
Single, no children 0.139 0.141 0.148 0.173
Single, children 0.014 0.016 0.024 0.030
Couple, no children 0.289 0.269 0.301 0.268
Couple, children 0.505 0.517 0.504 0.501
Other 0.053 0.058 0.024 0.029
Unemployment experience (yrs.) 0.364 0.568 0.623 0.984
Years of education:
7-10.5 0.332 0.382 0.114 0.150
11-12 0.299 0.297 0.485 0.517
12.5+ 0.369 0.320 0.402 0.334
Regional unemployment rate 9.286 9.321 18.952 18.979
Obs. 12,557 18,871 3,231 4,928
Notes: Pooled statistics for years 2001 to 2007.
Source: SOEP, own calculations.
income risk.16 Individuals were asked to specify their attitude towards general risk on a
eleven-point scale. The items were aggregated to ﬁve dummy variables. The buﬀer-stock
model is estimated using all observations since the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation
is applied (see Section A in the Appendix ) – a log-like transformation that allows to
include observations with zero or negative wealth.
16 For the saving ﬂows model I have enough data to estimate a ﬁxed eﬀects model. For the buﬀer stock
model, the samples are smaller and estimation in ﬁrst diﬀerences resulted in very large standard
errors.
26Table 2: Buﬀer-stock model: Descriptive statistics by region
West Germany East Germany
log(σ2) 13.311 12.571
Log permanent income 10.576 10.314
Permanent income 43,399.535 34,053.668
Risk propensity:




Very high 0.113 0.089
Age 46.287 46.425
Type of household:
Single, no children 0.144 0.177
Single, children 0.014 0.034
Couple, no children 0.271 0.271
Couple, children 0.515 0.492
Other 0.057 0.026





Regional unemployment rate 8.706 18.292
Obs. 4,754 1,253
Notes: Pooled data for years 2002 and 2007.
Source: SOEP, own calculations.
4.1. Data on wealth
SOEP includes a set of detailed questions on private wealth holdings in the years 2002
and 2007. Frick et al. (2007) provide an overview of the wealth data for 2002 and
describe how missing information was imputed using Hot-Deck imputation methods in
the case of item nonresponse or partial unit non-response. Data are available as ﬁve
multiple imputed datasets, which has to be taken into account in the subsequent analysis.
Therefore, I apply “Rubin’s rule” (Rubin, 1987, see Section B in the Appendix to this
paper) to all estimated statistics and predictions.
27The wealth module consists of questions on seven components of wealth. These
include information on owner-occupied housing (including mortgage debt), other property
(including mortgage debt), ﬁnancial assets, business assets, tangible assets, private
pensions (including life insurance) and consumer credits.17 The wealth information
was collected at the level of the individual. For the subsequent analysis, the wealth
components were aggregated to the household level. As explained above, I create two
aggregated measures of net wealth that are commonly used in the literature. The ﬁrst
measure, net worth, consists of all wealth components that are available in the SOEP
data except for business assets. The second measure is a subset of net worth and refers
to liquid assets. Here, I aggregate the information on ﬁnancial assets, tangible assets,
private pensions and consumer credits.
Table 3 shows statistics on ﬁnancial wealth and net worth. The amount of assets
is considerably lower in East Germany, which holds for both ﬁnancial wealth and net
worth. Mean ﬁnancial wealth is about 37,000 euro in the West and 16,000 euro in East
Germany. The deﬁnition of net worth adds real estate property (owner-occupied housing
and other property) to the ﬁnancial wealth measure. Average net worth is more than
three times higher than ﬁnancial wealth. The distribution of wealth is highly skewed. For
example, the mean is about twice as high as the median for both wealth aggregates and
samples. Note that a considerable share of households in the sample does not report to
hold positive net liquid assets (>20 percent) or positive net worth (>15 percent). About
half of these households are in debt.18
For the precautionary savings motive it is interesting to compare wealth holdings with
data on income. The median ratio of net liquid assets to permanent income is 0.41 in
West and 0.25 in East Germany. Accordingly, the median West (East) German household
17 The data lack information on pension entitlements for workers (statutory pension insurance and
company pension plans) and civil servants.
18 Only a negligible fraction of these households holds business assets.
28Table 3: Buﬀer-stock model: Descriptive statistics on ﬁnancial wealth and net worth by
region
West Germany East Germany
FW NW FW NW
Mean wealth 36,923 113,794 16,373 50,741
(1,799) (3,437) (1,234) (2,646)
Median wealth 15,969 63,350 8,000 25,456
(636) (2,408) (730) (2,620)
Wealth p90 90,272 274,400 47,722 133,100
(3,035) (6,888) (2,843) (6,525)
Wealth >0 0.782 0.847 0.758 0.827
(0.007) (0.006) (0.013) (0.012)
Wealth = 0 0.122 0.078 0.123 0.087
(0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.008)
Wealth <0 0.096 0.075 0.119 0.086
(0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.009)
Median ratio: wealth/permanent income 0.408 1.496 0.247 0.765
(0.011) (0.043) (0.016) (0.054)
Wealth <one month’s income 0.268 0.184 0.325 0.226
(0.007) (0.006) (0.014) (0.012)
Obs. 4,882 4,882 1,267 1,267
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Means and percentiles are estimated using “Rubin’s rule”.
Source: SOEP, own calculation
possesses roughly 41 (25) percent of its permanent annual income in net liquid assets.
This relation increases markedly when housing equity is included. The low median ratio
of liquid assets to permanent income corresponds to the relatively high share of 26 and
33 percent of households which hold liquid assets of less than one month’s income in
West and East Germany, respectively. This number is strongly reduced when housing
equity is included but still characterises about one ﬁfth of the samples.
295. Results of simulated income uncertainty
Table 4 shows the estimated coeﬃcients of equation (10). I ﬁnd similar qualitative results
as Haan and Myck (2009). There is a strong dependence between both processes. On
the one hand, I can ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of the lagged variables of the respective other
process, and, on the other hand, I can also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation between the
random eﬀects. In addition, results provide strong support for state dependence in health
and employment status.
Table 4: Regression results for the bivariate random eﬀects probit by region
West Germany East Germany
Bad health Unemployment Bad health Unemployment
Lagged health status 1.281∗∗ (0.026) 0.403∗∗ (0.038) 1.383∗∗ (0.046) 0.346∗∗ (0.057)
Lagged employment status 0.218∗∗ (0.031) 1.680∗∗ (0.037) 0.282∗∗ (0.046) 1.371∗∗ (0.045)
Age −0.182 (0.113) 0.660∗∗ (0.142) −0.113 (0.213) 0.614∗∗ (0.201)
Age2/100 0.491† (0.254) −1.690∗∗ (0.320) 0.343 (0.475) −1.500∗∗ (0.455)
Age3/100 −0.004∗ (0.002) 0.014∗∗ (0.002) −0.003 (0.003) 0.012∗∗ (0.003)
Years of education (ref. 11-12):
7-10.5 0.076∗∗ (0.024) 0.211∗∗ (0.033) 0.046 (0.048) 0.189∗∗ (0.047)
12.5+ −0.145∗∗ (0.029) −0.131∗∗ (0.041) −0.149∗∗ (0.047) −0.324∗∗ (0.049)
Initial health status 0.636∗∗ (0.030) 0.173∗∗ (0.044) 0.551∗∗ (0.053) 0.126† (0.065)
Initial employment experience −0.007∗ (0.003) −0.010∗∗ (0.004) −0.002 (0.006) −0.004 (0.006)
Initial employment status 0.028∗∗ (0.007) 0.068∗∗ (0.008) 0.033∗ (0.016) 0.183∗∗ (0.016)
Person in HH needs care 0.160∗∗ (0.061) 0.342∗∗ (0.076) 0.096 (0.094) 0.210† (0.110)
Foreign nationality 0.198∗∗ (0.037) 0.067 (0.274)
Type of household (ref. Single):
Single, children −0.337∗∗ (0.081) −0.116 (0.111)
Couple, no children −0.561∗∗ (0.050) −0.444∗∗ (0.069)
Couple, children −0.542∗∗ (0.046) −0.546∗∗ (0.063)
Other −0.329∗∗ (0.068) −0.388∗∗ (0.116)
Regional unemployment rate 0.029∗∗ (0.004) 0.016† (0.008)
Other HH income −1.480∗∗ (0.051) −1.260∗∗ (0.069)
Constant 0.329 (1.650) −9.238∗∗ (2.056) −0.900 (3.113) −8.856∗∗ (2.917)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
σ 1.437 (0.121) 1.312 (0.209) 1.253 (0.113) 1.192 (0.092)
ρc 0.528 (0.041) 0.612 (0.042)
ρε 0.183 (0.030) 0.172 (0.024)
Obs. 32,719 10,485
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; Signiﬁcance levels: † p <0.10, ∗ p <0.05, ∗∗ p <0.01
Source: SOEP, own calculation
The other covariates have the expected signs. With the exception of the age proﬁle,
the eﬀects of all other covariates that appear in both equations have the same sign. For
example, higher education reduces the risk of both unemployment and poor health. In
contrast to Haan and Myck (2009), I only ﬁnd a low eﬀect of the regional unemployment
rate. This can be explained by two factors: ﬁrst, I include time dummies. The regional
30unemployment rate in the model of Haan and Myck (2009) is in fact an interaction with
a time dummy. Second, Haan and Myck (2009) do not distinguish between East and
West Germany. Thus, the regional unemployment rate also contains information about
the diﬀerences in the level of unemployment between East and West Germany.
In order to assess the magnitude of the eﬀects and to compare them between both
regional subsamples, Table 5 presents simulated probabilities for an individual with
average characteristics. The results are simulated for diﬀerent values of the lagged health
and employment status. The table shows the respective transition probabilities. The
largest state dependence is found for being in good health and employment (sit = 1). It
amounts to 90 percent in West Germany and to a lower 86 percent in East Germany. For
this category, the probability to become unemployed in period t is nearly ten percent in
East Germany and only 3.5 percent in West Germany. Lagged poor health increases the
probability to become unemployed for West Germany to more than seven percent and to
about 15 percent in East Germany. The state dependence in unemployment for healthy
individuals is higher in East Germany (roughly 50 percent compared to 40 percent in
West Germany). The least regional diﬀerences are found for the status being in poor
health and unemployment.
These results clearly show the importance of health for the risk of unemployment. In
the simulation, I assume that the estimated coeﬃcients remain stable and that household
Table 5: Predicted transition probabilities of employment and health status by region
West Germany East Germany
si,t = 1 si,t = 2 si,t = 3 si,t−1 = 4 si,t = 1 si,t = 2 si,t = 3 si,t−1 = 4
si,t−1 = 1 90.1 6.4 3.0 0.5 85.7 4.9 8.4 1.0
si,t−1 = 2 56.1 36.4 3.2 4.2 51.1 32.7 7.6 8.6
si,t−1 = 3 55.5 4.7 34.3 5.6 46.3 3.6 43.9 6.3
si,t−1 = 4 26.4 19.0 24.4 30.1 20.7 16.4 27.3 35.7
Notes: The probabilities are simulated for an average individual in the regression sample. Rows sum up to 100
percent, deviations are due to rounding erros. See page 17 for the deﬁnition of sit.
Source: SOEP, own calculations.
31composition does not change over the next periods. The year eﬀects are orthogonalized
to the mean value and are set to zero. Other household income is assumed to grow at a
rate of two percent.19
Table 6 shows the estimated coeﬃcients of the wage regression using three diﬀerent
estimation methods (OLS, FE, FEsel) for West and East Germany. “FEsel” denotes
Wooldridge’s 1995 estimator.
A Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation with the individual ﬁxed
eﬀect at any conventional signiﬁcance level for both samples. Furthermore, the IMRs are
jointly signiﬁcant for both samples.20 Thus, the preferred speciﬁcation is FEsel.21
For the simulation, I focus on the eﬀects of lagged health and employment status.
Lagged poor health reduces wages by ﬁve percent in the OLS model for West Germany.
Controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects, the point estimate remains negative but becomes smaller
and insigniﬁcant. The eﬀect is very small and insigniﬁcant across all speciﬁcations for
East Germany. Thus, there is only a negligible negative direct health eﬀect on hourly
wages.22
Lagged unemployment also has a negative eﬀect on wages but its magnitude is larger
and, at least for the West German sample, remains signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. The
OLS model suggests a reduction of hourly wages by about 29 percent in the West and 17
percent in East Germany. This very large estimate is likely to be upward biased. Using
the ﬁxed eﬀects model, it is still signiﬁcant but reduced to twelve (West) and ﬁve (East)
19 This is a gross value and not aﬀected by the simulation if I assume constant behaviour of the other
household members.
20 A preliminary test with a simple selection indicator (Wooldridge, 2004) rejected the null hypothesis
that no selection bias is present (not reported).
21 I report standard OLS and FE results for comparison.
22 This result diﬀers from the ﬁndings in Jäckle and Himmler (2010). Using the SOEP, Jäckle and
Himmler (2010) estimate a similar wage model with health satisfaction instead of general health
status. They ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of deteriorated health for men but do not focus on the eﬀects of
unemployment in their model. They estimate a small signiﬁcant eﬀect of health on wages using the
same estimator. However, the models are not strictly comparable since samples, time window and
regressors, in particular the used health measure, are diﬀerent.
32percent respectively. In addition, when selection is accounted for, the eﬀect is further
reduced to two percent and gets insigniﬁcant in East Germany. In West Germany, it has
a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of 7.3 percent.
Table 6: Wage regression
West Germany East Germany
OLS FE FEsel OLS FE FEsel
Lagged health status −0.050∗∗ −0.009 −0.002 −0.016 −0.006 −0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023)
Lagged employment status −0.286∗∗ −0.123∗∗ −0.073∗∗ −0.165∗∗ −0.050∗ −0.019
(0.021) (0.020) (0.010) (0.024) (0.023) (0.013)
Age 0.049∗∗ 0.174∗∗
(0.019) (0.036)
Age2/100 −0.065 −0.022 −0.192∗∗ −0.358∗∗ −0.217∗ −0.329∗∗
(0.042) (0.055) (0.024) (0.081) (0.107) (0.077)
Age3/100 0.000 −0.000 0.001∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.001† 0.002∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of education (ref. 11-12):
7-10.5 −0.020∗∗ −0.005 −0.000 −0.014 −0.005 0.004
(0.005) (0.013) (0.020) (0.012) (0.032) (0.048)
12.5+ 0.116∗∗ 0.022 0.021 0.100∗∗ 0.027 0.036
(0.006) (0.026) (0.033) (0.013) (0.053) (0.031)
Regional unemployment rate −0.008∗∗ −0.003 0.008∗ −0.001 −0.001 0.017
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.011)
IMR No No Yes No No Yes
χ2
11 96.04∗∗ 47.92∗∗
Mundlak terms No No Yes No No Yes
χ2
39 1,559.38∗∗ 575.36∗∗
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm size dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hausman test (p-value) 0.00 0.00
No. of groups 5,699 1,669
Obs. 30,155 30,155 30,155 8,620 8,620 8,620
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; Signiﬁcance levels: † p <0.10, ∗ p <0.05, ∗∗ p <0.01
Source: SOEP, own calculation
In order to illustrate the economic signiﬁcance of the ﬁndings in Table 6, I simulate
33wages for an individual with average characteristics.23 Similar to the simulation for
health and employment status, I vary the simulation by lagged health and employment
status. Table 7 shows the simulated wage levels.
Table 7: Wage level predictions by lagged employment and health status and region
(diﬀerent regression models)
West Germany East Germany
OLS FE FEsel OLS FE FEsel
si,t−1 = 1 16.90 16.25 15.77 11.34 10.77 10.71
si,t−1 = 2 16.07 16.10 15.74 11.16 10.70 10.70
si,t−1 = 3 12.70 14.37 14.44 9.57 10.24 10.38
si,t−1 = 4 12.07 14.24 14.41 9.42 10.18 10.38
Notes: Wages are evaluated for an individual with average characteristics. See page 17 for the
deﬁnition of sit.
Source: SOEP, own calculations.
For an average man who was employed and in good health in the previous period
(si,t−1 = 1), the average hourly wage rate is nearly seven euro higher compared to
someone who was unemployed and in bad health (si,t−1 = 4) in the West German sample.
This diﬀerence turns out to be smaller in East Germany and amounts to less than two
euro. The coeﬃcients are smaller in the ﬁxed eﬀects approach. For West Germany, the
diﬀerence decreases to two euro and to less than one euro in East Germany. A selection
correction reduces the eﬀect even further, to about 1.3 euro in the West and 0.3 euro
in East Germany. The diﬀerences in wages between (si,t−1 = 1) and (si,t−1 = 2) and
between (si,t−1 = 3) and (si,t−1 = 4) are negligible due to the low estimated coeﬃcient of
lagged health status.
Distributions of the variances by health status and region are depicted in Figure 1. The
horizontal lines represent the mean variance. Figure 1a shows a higher income variance
in West Germany as compared to East Germany, which is presumably related to the
23 Year eﬀects, industry, occupation and ﬁrm size dummies are orthogonalized to their mean eﬀect.
I set these categorial dummies to zero in the simulation of future wages of currently unemployed
individuals.
34higher income level. However, diﬀerences between East and West Germany are smaller
than between individuals in bad and good health. Figure 1b shows that the simulated
variance for individuals in good health is higher than for those in bad health. Figures 1c
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Figure 1: Kernel densities of net household income variance by region and health sta-
tus
As expected, individuals with higher incomes or lower economic risks (good health
vs. bad health or West vs. East Germany) have a higher income variance. This is
important to keep in mind when I now turn to the savings model. Precautionary savings
should not be simply identiﬁed with low income households. In fact, the motive seems
particularly relevant for household which can loose much – in a relative sense – but with
35a low probability of occurrence.
5.1. Simulated uncertainty and subjective risk assessment
A simple test of the simulated uncertainty measure is to relate it to subjective risk
assessments and to test whether both measures are signiﬁcantly correlated and in what
direction. Two variables from SOEP are chosen: (1) worries about job security (three-
point scale) and (2) how likely it is for the respondent to lose his/her job within the next
two years (in percent).
The ﬁrst item is available for all years, whereas the second is asked only every other
year. The three-point scale is dichotomized to “1 = has worries” and “0 = no worries”
and a probit model is estimated. The second variable has a continuous scale and is
estimated using OLS. The subjective indicators are regressed on the same set of variables
as in the savings regression (Section 6.2, equation (4)). The only exception is that, in
addition to income variance, I regress the indicators on simulated employment and health
probabilities (only for period t+1). The probabilities add up to one, and a reference
category has to be deﬁned. Here it is the probability to be in good health and employed
in the next period.
Table 8 shows the regression results. The probabilities and income uncertainty are
signiﬁcant in nearly all models. The estimates reveal an interesting diﬀerentiation of the
uncertainty measure. Note that the questions about job security and worries are asked
conditional on being employed. First of all, negative expectations about job security in
the probit and OLS models are negatively correlated with simulated income variance and
permanent income. Secondly, the set of probabilities have positive signs. For example,
an estimated coeﬃcient of 28.8 in the OLS model (2) for West Germany implies c.p. that
an increase of one percentage point in the simulated probability to be unemployed in the








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37two years by 0.3 percentage points.24
This result shows that uncertainty measured by unemployment probabilities and
measured by income variance cannot simply be interpreted in the same way, as if
measuring the same concept of uncertainty. In general, higher income is associated with
more stable employment biographies and vice versa. Thus, it is not surprising that studies
on precautionary savings often ﬁnd that negative subjective expectations are negatively
correlated with savings (e.g., Essig, 2005). However, this is no evidence against the
precautionary savings motive but rather shows that individuals who assess their future
negatively often have no resources or motivation to save. Thus, for a precautionary
savings model, it is important to associate the unemployment/employment probabilities
with income. Individuals who face a low risk of becoming unemployed may have a good
reason and resources to save as a precaution for this unlikely event.
6. Multivariate analysis of precautionary savings
In the ﬁrst part of this section, the estimates for the regression of savings ﬂows on the
simulated income uncertainty according to equation (3) are presented. Results for the
buﬀer-stock model (equation (2)) are shown in the second part.
6.1. Buﬀer-stock wealth
As described above, a considerable share of the sample shows no or negative wealth
accumulation. In order to keep these observations (and their information) in the sample,
the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation is applied to the wealth aggregates. The
Appendix to this paper (Section A provides more details on the transformation.
24 Note that this eﬀect has to be interpreted with respect to the reference category. Thus, the increase
of one percentage point is c.p. equivalent to a decrease of one percentage point in the reference
category.
38Tables 9 and 10 report estimated marginal eﬀects for West Germany and East Germany,
respectively. The estimated coeﬃcients are reported in the Appendix. Marginal eﬀects
are evaluated at the median wealth level. The column with percentage-changes is an
approximation for larger values of the dependent variable.
For West Germany, the eﬀect of income uncertainty is signiﬁcantly positive for both
ﬁnancial wealth and net worth. A doubling of log variance increases ﬁnancial wealth
by 965 euro or roughly ﬁve percent. The magnitude of the absolute eﬀect increases to
3,734 euro when net worth is the dependent variable but the relative eﬀect of 5.7 percent
remains similar. The estimation is robust to the chosen wealth aggregate. This is the
ﬁrst important ﬁnding, since, as noted above, many studies report unstable results for
diﬀerent deﬁnitions of wealth. This is also visible when the share of precautionary wealth
is considered. Evaluated at the minimum risk, it amounts to 30 and 35 percent for FW
and NW, respectively. At the ﬁrst percentile, the estimates drop to 17 and 14 percent.
Thus, another important ﬁnding is that the magnitude of the share of precautionary
wealth is similar to the ﬁndings with respect to precautionary saving. And ﬁnally, the
share of precautionary wealth drops slightly when housing equity is included in the wealth
aggregate. Since it does not decrease proportionally – as shown above, the average share
of housing equity exceeds the share of ﬁnancial wealth in NW – a part of housing equity
must serve a precautionary purpose.
Findings are less consistent for East Germany than for the West German sample. The
estimated coeﬃcients of income risk are positive but not signiﬁcant and higher in the
model with net worth as dependent variable. Consequently, I can ﬁnd a higher share
of precautionary wealth when housing equity is included in the wealth aggregate. This
means that East Germans have relatively more precautionary wealth in real estate assets
than in ﬁnancial wealth. This is a counterintuitive ﬁnding, which requires further analysis.
A potential reason is the small sample. In particular the results for FW seem to be
inconsistent with the ﬁndings on precautionary saving and the model for NW. Although
39Table 9: Wealth regression, West Germany - marginal eﬀects
Financial wealth Net worth
Marginal eﬀect %-change Marginal eﬀect %-change
log(σ2) 965.297∗ 0.053∗ 3,734.480∗ 0.057∗
(475.423) (0.026) (1,590.736) (0.024)
Log permanent income 17,314.563∗∗ 0.956∗∗ 68,520.283∗∗ 1.039∗∗
(1,425.630) (0.079) (4,615.948) (0.070)
Age 2,808.429 0.155 26,169.784∗∗ 0.397∗∗
(2,784.322) (0.154) (9,513.399) (0.144)
Age2/100 −4,531.201 −0.250 −49,185.020∗ −0.746∗
(6,215.466) (0.343) (21,282.938) (0.323)
Age3/100 27.833 0.002 337.908∗ 0.005∗
(45.238) (0.002) (155.223) (0.002)
Type of household (ref. Single):
Single, children −15,346.669∗∗ −0.847∗∗ −38,998.420∗∗ −0.591∗∗
(3,645.737) (0.202) (12,928.130) (0.196)
Couple, no children −7,164.548∗∗ −0.396∗∗ −19,485.114∗∗ −0.295∗∗
(1,262.459) (0.069) (4,227.795) (0.064)
Couple, children −11,184.692∗∗ −0.618∗∗ −20,329.480∗∗ −0.308∗∗
(1,205.271) (0.067) (4092.110) (0.062)
Other −12,144.603∗∗ −0.671∗∗ −11,736.813† −0.178†
(1,882.590) (0.104) (6,113.453) (0.093)
Unemployment experience −1,134.177∗∗ −0.063∗∗ −6511.192∗∗ −0.099∗∗
(208.270) (0.012) (752.720) (0.011)
Years of education (ref. 11-12):
7-10.5 −1,664.026∗ −0.092∗ −8,095.792∗∗ −0.123∗∗
(844.515) (0.047) (3,033.661) (0.046)
12.5+ 4,217.542∗∗ 0.233∗∗ 5,865.468∗ 0.089∗
(919.023) (0.051) (2,970.550) (0.045)
Regional unemployment rate −460.623∗∗ −0.025∗∗ −3,049.386∗∗ −0.046∗∗
(120.904) (0.007) (405.021) (0.006)
Risk preference (ref. Medium):
Very low 1,499.648 0.083 3,960.432 0.060
(1,211.658) (0.067) (4,224.625) (0.064)
Low 2,336.474∗ 0.129∗ 6,057.598† 0.092†
(907.797) (0.050) (3,132.140) (0.047)
High 2,338.223∗∗ 0.129∗∗ 4,387.716 0.067
(898.719) (0.049) (2,976.959) (0.045)
Very high 336.067 0.019 −7,008.633† −0.106†
(1,254.916) (0.069) (4,050.575) (0.061)
Obs. 4,754 4,754 4,754 4,754






Notes: Estimated standard errors are corrected for multiple imputed datasets. Standard errors in parentheses;
Signiﬁcance levels: † p <0.10, ∗ p <0.05, ∗∗ p <0.01. Marginal eﬀects evaluated at the median wealth. (a) Γ is
estimated separately for each imputed dataset. Reported is the mean value. See Section A in the Appendix for more
information. (b) This value shows the share of savings that can be attributed to income uncertainty. The simulation
of ¯ PS
∗ in equation 6 is evaluated at the minimum and the 1st percentile of log(σ2).
Source: SOEP, own calculation
40not signiﬁcant, the magnitude of the point estimate is 1,341 euro or 5.2 percent. Like
the results for West Germany, this is similar to the results that are reported in Tables 11
and 12 for East Germany. The derived share of precautionary wealth in this model is 12
percent (ﬁrst percentile) which is also comparable to the previous ﬁndings.
6.2. Savings ﬂows
Table 11 shows the results for the savings regressions using the log of the variance σ2 as
uncertainty measure and log of monthly savings as dependent variable. The coeﬃcient of
income uncertainty is positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in nearly all models.
The only exception is the ﬁxed eﬀects model for East Germany, in which the coeﬃcient
is positive but not signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcients diﬀer between OLS, random eﬀects and
ﬁxed eﬀects, and the Hausman test rejects the null that the diﬀerences are not systematic
at any conventional signiﬁcance level. Due to larger standard errors, the conﬁdence
band of the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates comprises the point-estimates of both other models.
The ﬁxed eﬀects estimates amount to 0.054 and 0.042 for West and East Germany,
respectively. Since both the dependent and independent variables are in logs, the eﬀect
can be interpreted as an elasticity: Doubling σ2 leads to an increase of savings by 5.4
percent in the West and by 4.2 percent in East Germany. Given a mean amount of
monthly savings of 538 and 496 euro in West and East Germany this percentage increase
is equivalent to about 29 and 21 euro respectively. At the bottom of Table 11 it is
shown that an increase of log(σ2) by one standard deviation increases monthly savings
by roughly six percent in both West and East Germany.
The estimate of average precautionary saving is relatively sensitive to the chosen
reference value (σmin). In the ﬁxed eﬀects model, the share ranges between 27.6 and
16 percent or between 149 and 85 euro for West Germany. For East Germany it lies
between 19.6 and 13.9 percent or between 97 and 69 euro.
With respect to the other covariates, I ﬁnd that permanent income has a signiﬁcant
41Table 10: Wealth regression, East Germany - marginal eﬀects
Financial wealth Net worth
Marginal eﬀect %-change Marginal eﬀect %-change
log(σ2) 206.627 0.022 1,341.879 0.051
(436.470) (0.046) (1,405.594) (0.053)
Permanent income 10,598.212∗∗ 1.112∗∗ 31,431.552∗∗ 1.192∗∗
(1,216.054) (0.127) (3,933.071) (0.149)
Age −1,994.818 −0.209 3,297.789 0.125
(2,792.735) (0.293) (8,416.964) (0.319)
Age2/100 4,597.079 0.482 −3,622.966 −0.138
(6,250.528) (0.656) (18,872.979) (0.716)
Age3/100 −31.474 −0.003 13.699 0.001
(45.490) (0.005) (137.585) (0.005)
Type of household (ref. Single):
Single, children −7,289.606∗∗ −0.765∗∗ −7,572.007 −0.287
(1,861.403) (0.195) (6,683.797) (0.254)
Couple, no children −6982.383∗∗ −0.733∗∗ −13,924.989∗∗ −0.528∗∗
(1,340.049) (0.140) (4,093.954) (0.155)
Couple, children −7,936.092∗∗ −0.833∗∗ −12,675.752∗∗ −0.481∗∗
(1,301.137) (0.137) (4,029.026) (0.153)
Other −11,883.870∗∗ −1.247∗∗ −15,637.683† −0.593†
(2,881.400) (0.301) (8,529.524) (0.323)
Experience UE −342.326∗ −0.036∗ −891.670 −0.034
(157.618) (0.017) (554.981) (0.021)
Years of education (ref. 11-12):
7-10.5 −30.861 −0.003 −2,234.525 −0.085
(1,036.094) (0.109) (3,224.547) (0.122)
12.5+ 3,743.317∗∗ 0.393∗∗ 1,932.097 0.073
(849.669) (0.089) (2,697.777) (0.102)
Regional unemployment rate −66.258 −0.007 393.253 0.015
(149.508) (0.016) (476.284) (0.018)
Risk preference (ref. Medium):
Very low −522.243 −0.055 −5,159.919 −0.196
(1,499.155) (0.157) (4,308.855) (0.163)
Low −656.137 −0.069 −984.256 −0.037
(936.498) (0.098) (3,027.787) (0.115)
High −367.998 −0.039 −1,212.161 −0.046
(818.200) (0.086) (2,642.305) (0.100)
Very high −1,432.257 −0.150 3,677.980 0.139
(1,472.147) (0.155) (4,331.052) (0.164)
Obs. 1,253 1,253 1,253 1,253






Notes: Estimated standard errors are corrected for multiple imputed datasets. Standard errors in parentheses;
Signiﬁcance levels: † p <0.10, ∗ p <0.05, ∗∗ p <0.01. Marginal eﬀects evaluated at the median wealth. (a) Γ is
estimated separately for each imputed dataset. Reported is the mean value. See Section A in the Appendix for more
information. (b) This value shows the share of savings that can be attributed to income uncertainty. The simulation
of ¯ PS
∗ in equation 6 is evaluated at the minimum and the 1st percentile of log(σ2).
Source: SOEP, own calculation
42Table 11: Savings ﬂows regression by region (log savings, diﬀerent models)
West Germany East Germany
OLS RE FE OLS RE FE
log(σ2) 0.033∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.069∗∗ 0.050∗ 0.042
(0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.029)
Permanent income 1.194∗∗ 0.979∗∗ 1.125∗∗ 0.847∗∗
(0.029) (0.042) (0.056) (0.085)
Age 0.036 -0.036 -0.384∗∗ −0.217
(0.060) (0.077) (0.113) (0.153)
Age2/100 −0.106 0.052 0.160 0.807∗∗ 0.438 0.462
(0.133) (0.170) (0.230) (0.250) (0.339) (0.485)
Age3/100 0.001 -0.000 −0.001 -0.005∗∗ −0.003 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Type of household (ref. Single):
Single, children −0.179∗∗ -0.048 0.108 -0.175∗ 0.049 0.237
(0.058) (0.082) (0.095) (0.084) (0.134) (0.212)
Couple, no children −0.094∗∗ 0.132∗∗ 0.378∗∗ -0.203∗∗ 0.087 0.449∗∗
(0.024) (0.040) (0.056) (0.052) (0.080) (0.105)
Couple, children −0.465∗∗ -0.142∗∗ 0.233∗∗ -0.511∗∗ −0.085 0.384∗∗
(0.023) (0.039) (0.057) (0.054) (0.082) (0.113)
Other −0.435∗∗ -0.127∗∗ 0.271∗∗ -0.574∗∗ −0.026 0.496∗∗
(0.037) (0.046) (0.062) (0.096) (0.108) (0.135)
Unemployment experience −0.019∗∗ -0.021∗ −0.080∗ -0.011 −0.047∗∗ -0.112∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.032) (0.012) (0.016) (0.040)
Years of education (ref. 11-12):
7-10.5 −0.003 -0.041 0.014 -0.069 −0.079
(0.017) (0.029) (0.168) (0.046) (0.075)
12.5+ 0.151∗∗ 0.194∗∗ 0.183 0.068∗ 0.180∗∗
(0.017) (0.029) (0.123) (0.032) (0.052)
Regional unemployment rate −0.011∗∗ -0.010∗ 0.009 -0.005 −0.010 -0.020
(0.002) (0.004) (0.016) (0.006) (0.009) (0.024)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean savings 538 496
R2 0.38 0.22 0.38 0.29
Hausman test (p-value) 0.00 0.00
No. of groups 3,215 3,215 850 850
Obs. 12,557 12,557 12,557 3,231 3,231 3,231
Change of one sd. (a) 3.88 5.59 6.39 9.84 7.05 5.86
Share of prec. saving:
σminimum
(b) 18.09 24.76 27.66 30.05 22.90 19.59
σ1stpercentile
(b) 10.19 14.18 15.97 21.70 16.33 13.89
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; Signiﬁcance levels: † p <0.10, ∗ p <0.05, ∗∗ p <0.01. (a) This value shows
the percentage change of monthly savings if the uncertainty measure increases by one standard deviation. (b) This
value shows the share of savings that can be attributed to income uncertainty. The simulation of ¯ PS
∗ in equation 6
is evaluated at the minimum and the 1st percentile of log(σ2).
Source: SOEP, own calculation
43and positive eﬀect on saving in the OLS and random eﬀects model. However, due to its
construction, I cannot estimate a coeﬃcient for permanent income in the ﬁxed eﬀects
model since it is collinear. Interestingly, the dummies controlling for the type of household
switch sign when we control for ﬁxed eﬀects. Note that the reference category is a single
household without children. At ﬁrst sight, this is surprising because the negative sign
in the other two models could be explained by controlling for permanent income. Since
permanent household income is not weighted, it captures part of the eﬀect of household
size. It is diﬀerent, however, in the ﬁxed eﬀects model: these household characteristics
capture part of the eﬀect of household income in this model speciﬁcation. When I include
the current net household income in this regression (estimation not shown), the signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients disappear with the exception of a higher saving rate of couple households
without children. Economies of household size are a reasonable explanation.25
How robust are these ﬁndings to the exclusion of observations with zero monthly
savings? To answer this question, a random eﬀects tobit model is estimated using
all observations. Savings amounts enter the model in levels.26 Table 12 shows the
estimated marginal eﬀects. Following McDonald and Moﬃtt (1980), the marginal eﬀects
are decomposed: The ﬁrst column for each set of estimates presents the unconditional
marginal eﬀect, the second column the conditional marginal eﬀect, and the third column
the probability of being uncensored.
A straightforward way to compare the results between models is to look at the estimated
conditional share of precautionary saving. The tobit model results in very similar amounts
of precautionary saving as the ﬁxed eﬀects regression of log savings ﬂows. Evaluated
at the ﬁrst percentile, its share is about 14 percent in the tobit model compared to 16
25 The ﬁnding that singles save more than other households when permanent income is controlled for is
also found in other studies, e.g., in the papers by Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005), Bartzsch
(2008), and Fossen and Rostam-Afschar (2009).
26 A common practice is to add a constant, often unity, to savings and to apply the log-transformation.
However, the choice of the added constant is arbitrary and results may be sensitive to the chosen
constant.
44Table 12: Savings ﬂows regression including all observations, marginal eﬀects of ran-
dom eﬀects tobit models by region (estimation in levels)
West Germany East Germany
Uncond. Cond. Prob. Uncond. Cond. Prob.
log(σ2) 37.152∗∗ 27.624∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 30.703∗∗ 23.158∗∗ 0.029∗∗
(4.488) (3.343) (0.004) (6.761) (5.109) (0.006)
Log permanent income 367.173∗∗ 273.007∗∗ 0.313∗∗ 279.253∗∗ 210.630∗∗ 0.268∗∗
(16.748) (12.730) (0.014) (27.220) (20.944) (0.025)
Type of household (ref. Single):
Single, children −37.222 −27.676 −0.032 −73.531† −55.462† −0.071†
(27.581) (20.510) (0.024) (40.685) (30.706) (0.039)
Couple, no children 48.810∗∗ 36.292∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 74.416∗∗ 56.129∗∗ 0.071∗∗
(13.318) (9.901) (0.011) (23.616) (17.799) (0.022)
Couple, children −52.578∗∗ −39.094∗∗−0.045∗∗ −16.512 −12.455 −0.016
(13.431) (9.996) (0.012) (24.265) (18.310) (0.023)
Other −67.769∗∗ −50.389∗∗−0.058∗∗ −28.114 −21.206 −0.027
(17.921) (13.336) (0.015) (37.452) (28.259) (0.036)
Unemployment experience −12.882∗∗ −9.578∗∗−0.011∗∗ −11.667∗ −8.800∗ −0.011∗
(3.394) (2.523) (0.003) (5.136) (3.873) (0.005)
Years of education (ref. 11-12):
7-10.5 −2.264 −1.683 −0.002 −64.717∗ −48.813∗ −0.062∗
(13.848) (10.297) (0.012) (27.597) (20.823) (0.026)
12.5+ 92.616∗∗ 68.864∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 93.378∗∗ 70.432∗∗ 0.090∗∗
(14.238) (10.628) (0.012) (21.245) (16.129) (0.020)
Positive savings 0.67 0.66
Conditional mean 538 497
Unconditional mean 358 326
σminimum
(a) 69.28 31.93 41.05 18.03
σp1
(a) 30.59 13.59 31.28 14.08
No. of groups 3,852 3,852 3,852 1,046 1,046 1,046
Obs. 18,870 18,870 18,870 4,928 4,928 4,928
Notes: (a) This value shows the share of savings that can be attributed to income uncertainty. The simulation of
¯ PS
∗ in equation 6 is evaluated at the minimum and the 1st percentile of log(σ2). Standard errors in parentheses;
Signiﬁcance levels: † p <0.10, ∗ p <0.05, ∗∗ p <0.01
Source: SOEP, own calculation
45(West Germany) and 14 (East Germany) percent in the ﬁxed eﬀects model. In addition,
the table shows the share with respect to the unconditional mean of the latent variable
s∗. The share is considerably higher than for the conditional mean and sensitive to the
evaluation at the minimum compared to the ﬁrst percentile – at least for West Germany.
The shares evaluated at the ﬁrst percentile are about 30 percent in both samples.
A doubling of income uncertainty would increase the conditional mean value by about
28 euro or 5.2 percent in West Germany. And for East Germany, it would increase by 23
euro or 4.6 percent. Both estimates are close to the ﬁxed eﬀects coeﬃcients. Of course,
the eﬀect of doubling σ2 on the unconditional mean is larger. It amounts to 37 euro or
ten percent and to 31 euro or 9.5 percent in West and East Germany, respectively. The
change can also be calculated in terms of the savings rate. For example, using permanent
income and the average unconditional amount of monthly savings the savings rate is 9.9
percent in West Germany. An increase of 37 euro increases the unconditional savings
rate by about ten percent.
This model also shows that the uncertainty measure has a positive and signiﬁcant
impact on the probability to save. In both regions the eﬀect amounts to roughly three
percentage points. Given the share of 66 percent observations with positive monthly
savings, this is equivalent to an increase of about 4.5 percent.
467. Conclusion
The theory of precautionary savings predicts that individuals accumulate precautionary
wealth to insure themselves against expected (uninsured) future income shocks. Empirical
evidence on precautionary savings might be important for government policies that have
an impact on income uncertainty. The concept has a strong theoretical foundation but
the empirical results show an exceptionally rich diversity ranging from zero precautionary
savings to more than half of all wealth. The few studies for Germany are no exception,
and results vary considerably.
A potential reason for this diversity are the methodological problems associated with
the precautionary savings model. I suggest that the prevalence of ex-post measures of
economic risks is likely to neglect important aspects of the precautionary motive. As
an alternative I propose an ex-ante risk measure. The innovation of this study is the
way net household income variance is simulated and used in a model of precautionary
savings. Starting from the fact that unemployment is one of the most important economic
risks and has a strong linkage with health, the simulation model is built around a joint
estimation of health and unemployment risks. In addition to employment risks, wages in
the model depend on previous unemployment and health. The inherent path dependence
is exploited by simulating three future periods. To generate net household incomes, a
detailed tax beneﬁt microsimulation model is applied. This will allow to simulate changes
in the tax-beneﬁt system and their likely impact on precautionary savings in future
analyses.
All models are estimated separately for East and West Germany. The results underline
that the regional diﬀerentiation of labour markets indeed matters. The estimates show
that unemployment risks are not only higher in East Germany but also react more
strongly to deteriorated health. On the other hand, I do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcantly
negative eﬀect of previous unemployment on wages in East Germany whereas a large
47eﬀect of 7.3 percent can be found in West Germany. I do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant direct
eﬀect of health on wages.
I ﬁnd evidence for precautionary savings in response to the uncertainty measures. This
result holds for various speciﬁcations of a savings ﬂows regression and the buﬀer-stock
wealth model. First, an ad-hoc savings regression is speciﬁed. The data on savings
ﬂows allow to apply panel estimators and are used to compare the magnitude of the
eﬀects of the second model, a standard buﬀer-stock wealth model. Income uncertainty
has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on savings ﬂows in both East and West Germany. The
relative eﬀect is similar between regions although absolute savings are higher in West
Germany. If income uncertainty doubles, monthly savings increase by about ﬁve percent.
A conservative counterfactual simulation shows that about 16 percent of savings ﬂows can
be attributed to the precautionary motive in West Germany. The share is slightly lower
in the East and amounts to 14 percent. These results were estimated using log-savings
as dependent variable. However, the estimation is robust to the inclusion of zero-savings
observations and estimating a random eﬀects tobit.
The buﬀer-stock wealth model is estimated for two diﬀerent wealth aggregates, ﬁnancial
wealth and net worth. In contrast to many other studies the results are robust to the
chosen wealth measure – at least for West Germany. Income uncertainty is again
signiﬁcantly positive. An increase by 100 percent leads to a ﬁve percent increase in
precautionary wealth. Simulations suggest that about 17 percent of ﬁnancial assets and
14 percent of net worth has been accumulated due to the precautionary motive. The
lower value for net worth suggests that a part of housing equity serves as precautionary
savings.
The results for East Germany are somewhat less stable and require further investigation.
The coeﬃcient of income uncertainty is not signiﬁcant and the point estimate is higher
for net worth, which is counterintuitive. However, a closer look at the results for net
worth shows that the eﬀect – although insigniﬁcant – are similar to those estimated for
48the West German subsample.
In general, and in contrast to a number of empirical studies on precautionary savings,
my results are very robust and stable. Thus, they can be considered strong evidence for a
share of precautionary wealth of about 14 to 17 percent. These estimates are conservative
in the sense that they are not evaluated at the minimum risk but at the ﬁrst percentile
in order to avoid extreme outliers. In sum, I can show that a neither non-negligible nor
extremely large part of savings ﬂows and stocks results from the precautionary motive,
and that the proposed measure of income uncertainty is a promising approach to the
modelling of income risks.
49Appendix
A. Wealth transformation
The inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) function sinh
−1 oﬀers a solution to the problem of zero
or negative values of the dependent variable. Burbidge et al. (1988) suggest a general














where w is the observed wealth variable and Γ is a scaling parameter that allows the
distribution to be leptokurtic.27
The function is linear around the origin and symmetric. For large w, the function is
approximately a parallel shift of the logarithm: ln





≈ ln2Γ + lnw.
Pence (2006) shows how to calculate the marginal eﬀects with an IHS-transformed
dependent variable. Assume the following model:
y = f
IHS(Γ,w) = f(Γ) = xβ + ε (19)




β. It is also
possible to use the approximation βΓ for large w; it approximates the percentage change
in w for a unit change in x. Both types of marginal eﬀects are reported in Tables 9 and
10. The marginal eﬀects are calculated at the median wealth of the regression sample.
Burbidge et al. (1988) derive a likelihood function to determine the optimal Γ in
the case of an OLS estimator. Assuming normally distributed errors, the concentrated
log-likelihood for Γ in (19) is
l











where M = I − x(x0x)−1x0. To estimate the optimal Γ a grid search over Γ = 0 is
27 Ramirez et al. (1994) show that the normal distribution is only a special case as Γ approaches zero.
50performed to maximize (20).28 The grid search was performed for each of the imputed
datasets.
B. Combing results across multiple imputed datasets: “Rubin’s
rule”
As described in Frick et al. (2007), missing wealth information in the SOEP data
(2002,2007) were imputed using a multiple imputation procedure. The idea behind this
approach is to generate a number of diﬀerent complete datasets by imputing missing
values and to conduct separate statistical analyses on each of the imputed datasets. The
diﬀerent results are then combined according to “Rubin’s rule” (Rubin, 1987). This
procedure takes into account the variation between results obtained in each of the imputed
datasets and allows to account for the uncertainty involved with imputing missing values.
Suppose we are interested in a scalar quantity Q, for example the coeﬃcients or
marginal eﬀects of the buﬀer-stock model. Let ˆ Qj and ˆ Vj be parameter and variance
estimates from imputed dataset j with j = 1,...,m. The overall point estimate ˆ Q is the







A valid standard error of the estimated ˆ Q is obtained by combining within and between














(ˆ Vj − ˆ V
w)
2 (between variance) (23)
ˆ V = ˆ V




b (total variance) (24)
28 Pence (2006) derives a similar likelihood function for a quantile regression.
29 The exposition is based on Carlin et al. (2003).
51Rubin (1987) shows that approximately,
ˆ V
− 1
2(Q − ˆ Q) ∼ tdf (25)
where the degrees of freedom df are given by













A 100(1 − α)% conﬁdence interval for ˆ Q is





Table 13: Overview on selected empirical papers on precautionary savings
Paper Data Sample Dependent variable Risk measure Results
Skinner (1988) CE 1972/1973, Couple households
with household heads aged be-
tween 20 and 50, savings rates
lower than 50%, income be-
tween 2,000 and 35,000 dollars
Diﬀerence between




Occupational status Derives a share of more than
50% of precautionary savings in
a theoretical model of consump-
tion. The empirical estimates
do not show evidence for precau-
tionary savings. Individuals in
supposedly riskier occupations
save less.
Guiso et al. (1992) SHIW 1989, Household head depen-
dently employed and younger
than 65, households with nega-
tive net worth were excluded
Net worth Self-reported measure





for 2% of total net worth




Estimates the coeﬃcient of rela-
tive prudence as deﬁned in Kim-
ball (1990). The coeﬃcient is
not signiﬁcant, i.e. no indica-
tion of precautionary savings.
Dardanoni (1991) FES 1984 Households whose head is
single earner and dependently
employed
Total expenditures Occupation speciﬁc
earnings variance
Estimates an equation for opti-
mal consumption derived from
an intertemporal maximization
problem. About 60% of all sav-
ings in the sample arise from
precautionary motives
continued on next page ...
5
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head is between 25 and 65 years
of age
Current consumption Imouted variance
measures, estimated
on future waves of
PSID
A one standard deviation in-
crease in the “equivalent precau-
tionary premium” (EPP) (Kim-
ball, 1990) increases savings










Estimate a multiperiod dy-
namic programming model and
ﬁnd that diﬀerences in wealth
of diﬀerent groups can be ex-
plained by the interaction of un-












(3) total net worth
Permanent and tran-
sitory variance of to-
tal gross household
income based, esti-
mated on PSID waves
1981–1987
Signiﬁcant eﬀects of transitory
and permanent income variance;
No signiﬁcant eﬀects if self-
employed and farmers are ex-
cluded
Kazarosian (1997) NLS 1965–1980 Male household
heads between 45 and 59 in
1966
Total net worth in-
cluding business as-
sets
Decomposed variance A doubling of uncertainty in-
creases savings by 29%.
Lusardi (1997) SHIW Same sample as in Guiso et al.
(1992)
Net worth Self-reported measure




OLS estimates replicate the re-
sults in Guiso et al. (1992); but
IV methods lead to much higher
shares of precautionary savings
of about 20% to 24% of total
net worth.
continued on next page ...
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Paper Data Sample Dependent variable Risk measure Results
Carroll and
Samwick (1998)
PSID 1984 Households whose head is
younger than 50
same measures as in
Carroll and Samwick
(1997)
Log of a noramlised
version of EPP
Precautionary savings account
for about one third of liquid
wealth, half of non-housing,
non-business wealth, and 45%
of total net worth. No signiﬁ-
cant eﬀects if self-employed and
farmers are excluded.
Lusardi (1998) HRS Households with dependently
employed household head, aged
between 51 and 61 (wave(s) not
indicated)
Financial net wealth




ployment risk (p) and
current income (Y ):
variance measure





for 1 to 3.5% of net worth and
2 to 4.5% of ﬁnancial wealth.
Engen and Gruber
(2001)
SIPP 1984–1990 Household head be-
tween 25 and 64; must have
wage earnings from a non-self
employment job




Reducing the generosity of un-
employment beneﬁts by 50%
would raise ﬁnancial assets by
14%
Arrondel (2002) INSEE 1997 Full sample of house-
holds whose income is greater





variance over the next
5 years
Precautionary savings account
for 4.9 to 5.6% of ﬁnancial
wealth and for 3.9 to 4.6% of
net worth
Carroll et al. (2003) CPS/
SCF
1983,1989,1992 Household
heads between 20 and 65 years
of age
Net worth Probability of job loss
next year
Signiﬁcant eﬀects for house-
holds in higher permanent in-
come groups. The eﬀects van-
ish if housing wealth is excluded
from the wealth aggregate.
continued on next page ...
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Paper Data Sample Dependent variable Risk measure Results
Murata (2003) JPSC 1994, 1996 Couple households
whose reference person is aged
between 27 and 37, in which
the wive does not work full-time.










Uncertainty about public pen-
sions leads nuclear families but
not extended families to in-
crease precautionary wealth.
Using economic prospects as




SCF 1995, 1998 Three samples of
households whose head is (1) de-
pendently employed and aged
between 21 and 60, (2) not self-
employed and older than 62,









The descriptive analysis shows
a share of precautionary wealth
of 8% of net worth and 20% of
liquid wealth. Signiﬁcance and
importance of risk measures dif-
fer by estimation samples.










The more volatile the past in-
come development the lower the





SOEP 1998–2000 Main income earner
of the household is younger
than 56 and labour force par-
ticipant, not self-employed; sub-
samples that focus on migrants






Occupational status Precautionary savings: 20% in
East and 12% in West Germany;
60% in East and no precaution-
ary savings if zero-wealth obser-
vations are included (tobit)
continued on next page ...
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Paper Data Sample Dependent variable Risk measure Results
Bartzsch (2006,
2008)
SOEP 2002 Households whose head
is younger than 55, not self-
employed, not in education or
military service, not retired,
German citizen, has always par-
ticipated in SOEP between 1998
and 2004
Wealth: (1) net ﬁ-







Positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects
with respect to ﬁnancial wealth,
estimates of the share of precau-
tionary savings range between
14.6% and 26.7%. Negative or
insigniﬁcant eﬀects if housing
wealth is included.
Benito (2006) BHPS 1992–1998 Households whose
head is aged between 21 and
65
Weekly expenditures





A one standard deviation in-
crease in predicted unemploy-
ment probability decreases con-
sumption by 2.7%; No signiﬁ-




SOEP 2002, 2007 Households with
household heads between 18
and 55 who are employed
Net worth Diﬀerent income vari-
ance measures
Positive shares of precaution-








Savings rates Permanent and tran-
sitory net income vari-
ance
Doubling of average transitory
income uncertainty increases
savings by 4.4% or about 43
euro for an average household.
Eﬀects vary with type of house-
hold.
Hurst et al. (2010) PSID 1984, 1994 Households whose
head is aged between 26 and 50,
has positve net worth
Net worth Decomposed income
variance
The share of precautionary sav-
ings in total wealth drops from
50% to less than 10% when ac-
counting for diﬀerences between
self-employed and other groups.
continued on next page ...
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Paper Data Sample Dependent variable Risk measure Results
Giavazzi and McMa-
hon (forthcoming)
SOEP 1995–2000 Balanced sample of
households.
Savings rates Quasi-natural experi-
ment, dummy control-
ling for policy change
that increased future
income uncertainty
The increase in uncertainty of
the future income path leads
to an annual increase in sav-
ings rates of 3%-points. It has
also a large positive eﬀect on
hours worked of part-time work-
ing heads of households.
Abbreviations: BHPS - British Panel Household Survey (UK); CE - Consumer Expenditure Survey (US); CPS - Current Population Survey (US); FES - Family Expenditure
Survey (UK); HRS - Health and Retirement Study (US); INSEE - INSEE Survey on wealth ‘Patrimoine 97’ (FR); JPSC - Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JP);
LWR - Laufende Wirtschaftsrechnung “Continuous Household Budget Survey” (DE); NLS - National Longitudinal Survey (CA); PSID - Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(US); SAVE - Sparen und Altersvorsorge in Deutschland “Savings and old-age provisions in Germany” (DE); SCF - Survey of Consumer Finances (US); SHIW - Survey
of Household Income and Wealth (IT); SIPP - Survey of Income and Program Participation (US); SOEP - Socio-economic Panel Study (DE)
Source: Own compilation
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8Table 14: Descriptive statistics for the bivariate random eﬀects probit model by region
West Germany East Germany
mean sd. mean sd.
hit = 1 0.131 0.338 0.134 0.341
eit = 1 0.109 0.312 0.201 0.401
sit = 1 0.798 0.402 0.726 0.446
sit = 2 0.093 0.290 0.073 0.259
sit = 3 0.071 0.257 0.139 0.346
sit = 4 0.038 0.192 0.062 0.241
Age 44.334 8.624 45.232 8.521
Foreign nationality 0.123 0.328 0.003 0.053
Years of education:
7-10.5 0.396 0.489 0.176 0.381
edu. 11-12 0.297 0.457 0.528 0.499
12.5+ 0.306 0.461 0.296 0.456
Person in HH needs care 0.023 0.148 0.030 0.170
Type of household:
Single, no children 0.113 0.317 0.118 0.322
Single, children 0.028 0.164 0.032 0.177
Couple, no children 0.238 0.426 0.242 0.428
Couple, children 0.555 0.497 0.573 0.495
Other 0.066 0.249 0.035 0.185
Regional unemployment rate 9.452 3.005 18.866 2.393
Log other HH income 0.708 0.284 0.587 0.308
Obs. 32,719 10,485
Source: SOEP, own calculation
59Table 15: Sample statistics for the wage model by region
West Germany East Germany
mean sd mean sd
Log hourly wage 2.787 0.423 2.384 0.459
Bad health 0.105 0.307 0.091 0.288
Lagged employment status 0.022 0.146 0.054 0.225
Lagged health status 0.095 0.293 0.085 0.278
Age 44.592 8.992 45.200 8.863
Foreign nationality 0.110 0.313 0.002 0.048
Years of education:
7-10.5 0.368 0.482 0.138 0.345
11-12 0.303 0.460 0.525 0.499
12.5+ 0.329 0.470 0.336 0.473
Person in HH needs care 0.019 0.135 0.021 0.143
Type of household:
Single, no children 0.112 0.315 0.106 0.307
Single, children 0.025 0.156 0.028 0.165
Couple, no children 0.245 0.430 0.246 0.431
Couple, children 0.553 0.497 0.584 0.493
Other 0.066 0.248 0.036 0.187
Regional unemployment rate 9.376 2.977 18.810 2.349
Log other HH income 0.763 0.214 0.660 0.241
Obs. 30,110 8,592
Source: SOEP, own calculation
60Table 16: Wealth regression - coeﬃcients
West Germany East Germany
FW NW FW NW
log(σ2) 456.415∗ 1,051.829∗ 112.293 347.737
(224.848) (446.147) (237.309) (364.055)
Log permanent income 8,187.358∗∗ 19,311.650∗∗ 5,759.405∗∗ 8,180.414∗∗
(690.238) (1343.458) (682.159) (1,105.676)
Age 1,325.700 7,372.330∗∗ −1,084.654 851.791
(1,313.057) (2,670.714) (1,519.652) (2189.070)
Age2/100 −2,138.153 −13,854.865∗ 2,499.572 −929.090
(2,933.844) (5,977.925) (3,401.263) (4912.241)
Age3/100 13.133 95.181∗ −17.115 3.466
(21.363) (43.603) (24.753) (35.823)
Single, children −7,255.460∗∗ −10,989.890∗∗ −3,961.938∗∗ −1,971.811
(1,720.881) (3,642.016) (1,020.630) (1743.121)
Couple, no children −3,388.860∗∗ −5,491.496∗∗ −3,794.762∗∗ −3,622.526∗∗
(609.079) (1,194.476) (738.827) (1073.276)
Couple, children −5,288.787∗∗ −5,729.595∗∗ −4,312.336∗∗ −3,295.413∗∗
(578.399) (1157.653) (715.132) (1,045.716)
Other −5,743.724∗∗ −3,308.739† −6,461.505∗∗ −4,090.210†
(905.934) (1,726.127) (1,596.440) (2,297.501)
Experience UE −536.117∗∗ −1,835.078∗∗ −185.907∗ −231.182
(97.401) (214.197) (85.487) (143.545)
edu. 7-10.5 −787.439† −2,282.045∗∗ −14.555 −577.448
(401.320) (857.443) (563.010) (834.562)
edu. 12.5+ 1,993.837∗∗ 1,652.408∗ 2,034.795∗∗ 505.161
(433.070) (835.344) (469.023) (704.031)
Regional unemployment rate −217.749∗∗ −859.461∗∗ −35.923 102.762
(56.964) (115.460) (81.202) (124.978)
Very low 709.413 1,115.859 −282.518 −1,347.343
(573.870) (1,191.018) (817.192) (1132.495)
Low 1,104.135∗ 1,706.467† −356.263 −258.432
(427.016) (880.480) (508.881) (789.231)
High 1,107.076∗ 1,236.212 −200.210 −316.970
(430.908) (838.579) (444.915) (689.013)
Very high 160.491 −1,973.918† −777.765 958.602
(594.587) (1,139.823) (799.513) (1,129.739)
Obs. 4,754 4,754 1,253 1,253
IHS: Γ (a) 0.000116 0.000055 0.000193 0.000144
Notes: Estimation of standard errors takes into account multiple imputed datasets. Standard errors in parentheses;
Signiﬁcance levels: † p <0.10, ∗ p <0.05, ∗∗ p <0.01. (a) Γ is estimated separately for each imputed dataset.
Reported is the mean value. See Section A in the Appendix for more information.
Source: SOEP, own calculation
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